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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1804 
_____________ 
 
S.D., a minor, by his parents and natural guardians,  
A.D. and R.D.; A.D.; R.D., 
         Appellants 
 
v. 
 
HADDON HEIGHTS BOARD OF EDUCATION  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(1:14-cv-01880) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
______________ 
 
Argued:  January 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  August 18, 2016) 
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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 A.D. and R.D., individually and on behalf of their son 
S.D. (collectively, “Appellants”), filed suit against Haddon 
Heights Board of Education (“Appellee”), alleging violations 
of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“Section 504”), 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 
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§§ 12101–12213, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Constitution of the United States pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 10:5–1 et seq.  The District Court dismissed 
Appellants’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because Appellants failed to exhaust the administrative 
process provided for by the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.  In doing 
so, the District Court relied on our opinion in Batchelor v. 
Rose Tree Media School District, 759 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 
2014), in which we held that claims that a school district 
retaliated against a child and/or the child’s parents for 
enforcing the child’s rights under the IDEA, although brought 
pursuant to non-IDEA statutes, were subject to the IDEA 
exhaustion requirement. 
 The narrow question before us here is whether claims 
that a board of education discriminated against a student 
and/or the student’s parents based on his disability, and 
retaliated against them for enforcing the child’s rights under a 
non-IDEA statute, are subject to the IDEA exhaustion 
requirement.  Because Appellants’ alleged injuries are 
educational in nature and implicate services within the 
purview of the IDEA, we conclude that Appellants’ claims 
must be exhausted under the IDEA. 
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I. BACKGROUND1 
A. The 2012–13 School Year 
 S.D. suffers from “multiple medical problems 
including chronic sinusitis with frequent acute exacerbations, 
allergic rhinitis, and intermittent asthma.”  Am. Compl., Ex. 
C at 2.  Appellants allege that these medical “impairments [] 
substantially limit him in . . . the life activity of learning.”  Id. 
¶ 12.  S.D.’s doctor concluded that these medical problems 
“make it likely that he will have frequent school absence[s] 
due to acute [and] underlying chronic illness,” and suggested 
that S.D. “should qualify for [Section] 504 plan modifications 
for school.”  Id. ¶¶ 25–26; Ex. C at 2. 
 During the 2012–13 school year, when S.D. was in 
ninth grade at Haddon Heights Junior/Senior High School in 
New Jersey, Appellee developed a student accommodation 
plan for S.D. pursuant to Section 504 (“Section 504 Plan”).  
Id. ¶ 29, Ex. A.  This initial Section 504 Plan, dated October 
25, 2012, provided S.D. with “extra time for assignments, 
tests, and quizzes” and required Appellants to “communicate” 
with S.D.’s teachers about “any missed work” and absences.  
Id. ¶¶ 29–30; Ex. A at 2.  Appellants allege that the initial 
Section 504 Plan “was not properly implemented or 
effective” because it “did not impose any enforceable 
obligation on [Appellee] and its teachers” and “did not give 
S.D. any way to be instructed in and learn the material that he 
missed while absent.”  Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
                                                 
1 The following facts are taken from Appellants’ Amended 
Complaint and exhibits.  As explained infra Part II, we accept 
Appellants’ allegations as true.   
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 After S.D.’s parents met with Appellee and expressed 
their concerns, Appellee amended S.D.’s Section 504 Plan.  
The amended Section 504 Plan, dated April 19, 2013:  
required teachers to send weekly updates about S.D.’s 
missing assignments and to provide class notes; required S.D. 
to complete his assignments within two weeks of any 
absence; allowed teachers to reduce S.D.’s assignments at 
their discretion; and required S.D. to create a “to do” list, 
keep folders of complete and incomplete work, and 
communicate with teachers, the guidance counselor, and 
school nurse.  Id. ¶ 39, Ex. B. 
 Appellants allege that these Section 504 Plans failed to 
“provide a mechanism . . . for S.D. to obtain homebound 
instruction or other supplemental instruction to enable him to 
keep up with the curriculum . . . and otherwise enjoy the 
benefits of the educational program to the same extent as his 
non-disabled peers.”  Id. ¶ 41.  As a result, S.D. had “to teach 
himself the curriculum and try to identify and understand 
assignments that had been explained when he was absent.”  
Id. ¶ 45.  Therefore, according to Appellants, S.D. fell 
“further and further behind.”  Id. 
 The attendance policy in effect during the 2012–13 
school year prohibited a student from earning credit for a 
year-long course in which the student had accrued more than 
fifteen absences, unless the student provided certain 
documentation to excuse the excess absences, including, inter 
alia, a “[m]edical note from a physician.”  Id., Ex. D.  During 
the 2012–13 school year, S.D. accrued “over 33 absences[,] . . 
. most of [which] related to S.D.’s disabilities.”  Id. ¶¶ 48–49.  
Nevertheless, he passed his courses and earned the requisite 
number of credits for promotion to the tenth grade.  Id. ¶ 50.   
6 
 
B. New Attendance Policy for the 2013–14 School 
Year 
 In the summer of 2013, Appellee enacted a new 
attendance policy for the 2013–14 school year that required 
students to be retained if they accrued more than 33 absences 
in a school year—regardless of whether the absences were 
“excused, approved, [or] unexcused.”  Id. ¶ 53; Ex. E.2  
Students with more than fifteen unexcused absences were 
required to attend a “Saturday Credit Reinstatement Program” 
in order to obtain credit sufficient to pass their courses.  Id. 
¶ 60; Ex. E. 
 Appellants allege that Appellee “made a deliberate 
choice to enact the Policy,” despite Appellee’s knowledge 
that it was “substantially likely” that the new attendance 
policy would harm S.D.’s ability to advance in school, in 
order to “target” students like S.D. who had frequent excused 
absences.  Id. ¶¶ 54–55.  Appellants assert that, because the 
                                                 
2 The Policy reads in full: 
STUDENTS ARE LIMITED TO A TOTAL OF 33 
ABSENCES IN A SCHOOL YEAR.  THIS 
INCLUDES ANY ABSENCE (INCLUDING 
EXCUSED, APPROVED, AND UNEXCUSED).  The 
only exception is home instruction approved by the 
district.  STUDENTS WITH MORE THAN 33 DAYS 
ABSENT WILL BE RETAINED. 
Id. ¶ 53. 
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new attendance policy allowed students with unexcused 
absences to make up credits and progress to the next grade 
through the Saturday Credit Reinstatement Program, but 
offered no such mechanism for students with absences 
excused by, for example, a disability, to make up credits, the 
policy had an impermissible discriminatory effect.  Id. ¶¶ 61–
62. 
C. The 2013–14 School Year 
 Appellee readopted S.D.’s amended Section 504 Plan 
for the 2013–14 school year without reference to, or 
accommodation for, the new attendance policy.  Id. ¶¶ 40, 70.  
By March 2014, S.D. had accumulated thirty-seven absences 
due to his disability, all of which were excused by medical 
notes.  Id. ¶ 76.3  In a letter dated March 13, 2014, the 
principal of S.D.’s school informed S.D.’s parents that S.D. 
would be retained pursuant to the new attendance policy.  Id. 
¶¶ 73–75.  After S.D.’s parents received the principal’s letter, 
they filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights, but 
then decided to pursue litigation to try to prevent S.D. from 
being retained for the 2014–15 school year.  Id. ¶ 83–84.  
Appellants commenced the instant federal action on March 
25, 2014 by filing a two-count complaint alleging violations 
of Section 504 and the ADA.   
 On April 11, 2014, Appellants filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Appellee from 
retaining S.D. based on his number of absences.  On April 15, 
                                                 
3 S.D. accrued fifty-eight absences during the 2013–14 school 
year, fifty-six of which were excused by a doctor’s note.  Id. 
¶¶ 66–67.   
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2014, Appellee notified S.D.’s parents that it had revised 
S.D.’s Section 504 Plan to require him to make up absences 
excused by his disability by attending “Saturday school for 
credit reinstatement.”  Id. ¶ 85.  The new Section 504 Plan 
also provided for “make-up attendance with homebound 
instruction for absences related to” S.D.’s disability.  Id.   
 Appellants allege that the April 2014 Section 504 Plan 
was insufficient because it required S.D. to “log[] time in the 
school building” and failed to “appropriately compensate for 
instruction S.D. missed for earlier absences.”  Id. ¶¶ 91–92.  
Appellants assert that the requirement for S.D. to attend the 
Saturday credit reinstatement program was “punitive rather 
than educational” because S.D. had to “serve” Saturdays with 
students who had unexcused absences and the program did 
not “provide a means of obtaining instruction missed.”  Id. 
¶ 94. 
 In June 2014, the parties reached a settlement 
agreement that resolved Appellants’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  S.D.’s parents paid for him to complete a summer 
driver’s education course in order to be promoted to eleventh 
grade.  Id. ¶ 96.  However, Appellants now allege that this 
requirement was “punitive and retaliatory” because it 
“serve[d] no educational purpose.”  Id. ¶ 99. 
D. Appellants’ Amended Complaint and the District 
Court’s Opinion 
 In August 2014, the District Court granted Appellants 
leave to file an amended complaint that alleged six counts of 
discrimination and retaliation by Appellee based on S.D.’s 
disability and assertion of his rights under Section 504.  The 
Amended Complaint attached several exhibits, including two 
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letters from S.D.’s doctor, S.D.’s four Section 504 Plans, and 
the Board’s two attendance policies.  Appellants sought 
thirteen forms of relief, including, inter alia, compensatory 
education and compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. at 
27–28.   
 Appellee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a 
claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6), respectively.  The District Court concluded that 
Appellants’ claims required compliance with the IDEA’s 
administrative process and dismissed the claims without 
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See A.D. v. 
Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 90 F. Supp. 3d 326, 341–43 
(D.N.J. 2015).4  Upon dismissing Appellants’ federal claims, 
the District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Appellants’ state law claims, and dismissed 
those as well.  Id. at 342 n.14. 
 This timely appeal followed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Appellants invoked federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343; however, the District Court’s 
jurisdiction is squarely at issue in this case.  We have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                 
4 It is undisputed that Appellants have not exhausted the 
IDEA administrative process. 
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 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 271.  We construe 
Appellee’s motion as a facial challenge to the District Court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, we apply the same 
standard of review in considering a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6)—i.e., we view the alleged facts in favor of 
Appellants, the non-moving party.  See Constitution Party of 
Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).5 
                                                 
5 Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) may be “facial” or “factual,” and the “distinction 
determines how the pleading must be reviewed.”  Aichele, 
757 F.3d at 357.  “Facial attacks . . . contest the sufficiency of 
the pleadings, and the trial court must accept the complaint’s 
allegations as true.”  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Turicentro, S.A. v. 
Am. Airlines, 303 F.3d 292, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002)).  In 
contrast, a factual challenge “concerns the actual failure of a 
plaintiff’s claims to comport factually with the jurisdictional 
prerequisites,” and permits the district court to independently 
evaluate all the evidence to resolve disputes over 
jurisdictional facts.  Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358 (quoting CNA v. 
United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008))); see S.R.P. 
ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Here, the District Court construed Appellee’s motion 
to dismiss as a factual attack.  Because Appellee neither 
answered Appellants’ Amended Complaint, nor offered any 
factual averments in support of its motion to dismiss, we 
conclude that the District Court erred.  See Aichele, 757 F.3d 
at 358 (“The Commonwealth filed the [jurisdictional] attack 
before it filed any answer to the Complaint or otherwise 
presented competing facts.  Its motion [to dismiss] was 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. The IDEA Statutory Scheme 
 Congress enacted the IDEA to “ensure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 
public education that emphasizes special education and 
related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . .”  20 
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).  States receive federal education 
funding upon complying with several requirements, including 
making available a free appropriate public education 
(“FAPE”) to children with disabilities and ensuring that such 
children and their parents are provided with due process.  
Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 271–72.  If a child’s parents believe 
that a school has not fulfilled its statutory obligations, the 
IDEA provides them an avenue to file a complaint and obtain 
an administrative hearing “with respect to any matter relating 
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); see also 
id. § 1415(f).  After exhausting this administrative hearing 
process, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision[s]” made during the hearing may seek judicial 
review in federal court.  Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).  “In the normal 
case, exhausting the IDEA’s administrative process is 
required in order for the statute to ‘grant subject matter 
                                                                                                             
therefore, by definition, a facial attack.”).  However, at oral 
argument, both parties conceded that any error was harmless.  
We agree.  The District Court stated that it accepted 
Appellants’ allegations as true for purposes of the motion to 
dismiss, and only considered the Amended Complaint and 
attached exhibits. 
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jurisdiction to the district court.’”  Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 272 
(quoting Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 
F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir 1994)). 
 
 Section 1415(l) of the IDEA requires exhaustion of the 
administrative hearing process not only in actions brought 
directly under the IDEA, but also “in non-IDEA actions 
where the plaintiff seeks relief that can be obtained under the 
IDEA.”  Id.  Section 1415(l) provides: 
 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or 
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available 
under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.], 
or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children 
with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil 
action under such laws seeking relief that is also 
available under this subchapter, the procedures under 
subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same 
extent as would be required had the action been 
brought under this subchapter. 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).  “This provision bars plaintiffs from 
circumventing [the] IDEA’s exhaustion requirement by 
taking claims that could have been brought under [the] IDEA 
and repackaging them as claims under some other statute.”  
Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 272 (quoting Jeremy H. v. Mount 
Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
 In Batchelor, we explained that “determining if the 
IDEA’s administrative process must be exhausted before 
bringing claims in federal court turns on whether the parties 
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could have asserted the claims under the IDEA.”  Id. at 273.  
“Intertwined with this inquiry is whether the claim could have 
been remedied by the IDEA’s administrative process.”  Id.  
We reiterate here that the ultimate question is whether a non-
IDEA claim falls within the scope of a complaint 
contemplated by the IDEA—i.e., whether the non-IDEA 
claim “relate[s] to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child.”  Id. at 
274 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)).  To answer this 
question, a court must evaluate the nature of a plaintiff’s 
claims and the “theory behind the grievance.”  Id. at 276 
(quoting Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 
F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
B. Batchelor and the Scope of Section 1415(l) of the 
IDEA 
 In Batchelor, a mother (“Ms. Batchelor”) sued a 
school district individually and on behalf of her son, Ryan 
(collectively, “plaintiffs”).  When Ryan was diagnosed with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in his freshman year of 
high school, the school district developed an educational plan 
pursuant to Section 504.  Id. at 269.  By Ryan’s sophomore 
year, however, he was struggling and Ms. Batchelor 
complained to the school district that it was not providing 
Ryan with the support services required by the Section 504 
plan.  Id.  At that time, Ryan was tested and diagnosed with 
an additional math disability and the school district developed 
an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for Ryan pursuant to 
the IDEA.  Id.  Ms. Batchelor and the school district also 
entered into a settlement agreement.  Id. at 270.   
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 However, plaintiffs alleged that, during Ryan’s junior 
and senior years, the school district engaged in retaliatory acts 
against them, such as changing Ryan’s tutor, assigning Ryan 
to a teacher who was known to be a bully, and refusing to 
allow Ryan to participate in extracurricular activities.  See id. 
at 270, 274.  The plaintiffs then sued, asserting three federal 
claims:  (1) retaliation/failure to provide a FAPE, in violation 
of the IDEA; (2) retaliation in violation of Section 504; and 
(3) retaliation in violation of the ADA.  Id. at 270. 
 
 We concluded that the Section 504 and ADA 
retaliation claims “relate[d] unmistakably” and “palpably 
relate[d]” to the school district’s provision of a FAPE to 
Ryan.  Id. at 273–74 (quoting Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 
210 (1st Cir. 2000)).  In other words, there was “a logical path 
to be drawn from [plaintiffs’ non-IDEA] claims of retaliation 
to the District’s failure to provide, and Ms. Batchelor’s effort 
to obtain for, Ryan” a FAPE pursuant to the IDEA.  Id. at 
274–75.  Because the plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA 
retaliation claims “relate[d] to . . . the provision of a [FAPE],” 
they could have been brought and remedied under the IDEA, 
and, pursuant to § 1415(l), had to be administratively 
exhausted.  Id. at 274. 
 
 In so holding, we invoked the “strong policy reason 
[for] requiring exhaustion of remedies available under the 
IDEA.”  Id. at 275.  Exhaustion “develop[s] the record for 
review on appeal,” “encourag[es] parents and the local school 
district to work together to formulate an IEP for a child’s 
education,” and “allow[s] the education agencies to apply 
their expertise and correct their own errors.”  Id. (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  Thus, based on “the plain 
language and structure of the IDEA, . . . the purpose of the 
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IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and the policy concerns 
supporting it,” we concluded that “retaliation claims related to 
the enforcement of rights under the IDEA must be exhausted 
before a court may assert subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. 
C. Appellants’ Non-IDEA Claims 
 Although Appellants’ non-IDEA claims do not, as in 
Batchelor, arise from their enforcement of rights explicitly 
under the IDEA, we nevertheless conclude, based on the 
nature of Appellants’ allegations, that their discrimination and 
retaliation claims are subject to the IDEA exhaustion 
requirement.  Our holding here is a narrow extension of 
Batchelor, but we continue to focus on whether a plaintiff’s 
alleged injuries could be remedied through the IDEA 
administrative process because they relate to the “the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement” of a 
child or to “the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child,” as defined by the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(6)(A).   
 
 Here, Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint 
assert discrimination claims under Section 504 and the ADA, 
respectively.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102–113.  The District Court 
succinctly summarized the relevant allegations as:  “whether 
[Appellee] appropriately identified S.D. as a student with a 
disability; [] what constitutes a [FAPE] for S.D.; and whether, 
and to what extent, the various accommodations sufficiently 
addressed S.D.’s right to a FAPE.”  A.D., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 
341.  Importantly, Appellants’ discrimination claims arise 
from educational harm to S.D.; Appellants allege that the 
Section 504 Plans developed by Appellee were deficient such 
that S.D. was denied “educational opportunities” and “fell 
further and further behind” regarding his progress with the 
16 
 
curriculum.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–46; see Batchelor, 759 F.3d 
at 278 (“It is clear that [b]oth the genesis and the 
manifestations of the problem[s] are educational.”) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
 
 We conclude that Appellants’ alleged education 
injuries in Counts I and II of their Amended Complaint relate 
to the provision of a FAPE, as defined by the IDEA.  The 
IDEA defines “FAPE” to include “special education and 
related services” that are free, include an “appropriate” 
education, and are provided in conformity with an IEP.  20 
U.S.C. § 1401(9).  Under the IDEA, “special education” 
means “specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique 
needs of a child with a disability.”  Id. § 1401(29).  Central to 
Appellants’ discrimination claims is that Appellee should 
have provided alternative or supplemental instruction to S.D.  
See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 41 (Appellee “did not provide . . . 
homebound instruction or other supplemental instruction” to 
S.D.); id. ¶ 46 (Appellee failed “to offer any alternative 
instruction to S.D.”); id. ¶ 56 (referencing homebound 
instruction); id. ¶ 80 (Appellee failed to “offer S.D. any way 
to recoup the instruction he missed”); id. ¶ 92 (“[I]t is critical 
that arrangements for [S.D.] to make up educational time he 
has missed focus on the instruction he needs most.”).  The 
theory behind Appellants’ grievance is that Appellee failed to 
provide instruction tailored to meet S.D.’s special needs 
resulting from his disability.  Their claims therefore relate to 
the provision of a FAPE to S.D.  Thus, Appellants’ 
discrimination claims in Counts I and II could have been 
remedied through the IDEA’s administrative process. 
 
 Appellants’ retaliation claims in Counts III and IV 
challenge the appropriateness of Appellee’s initial decision to 
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retain S.D. in the tenth grade, its enactment of the revised 
attendance policy to retain students based on a total number 
of absences, and its choice of make-up courses to allow S.D. 
to progress to the eleventh grade.  See id. ¶¶ 120–123, 129–
132.  Appellants allege that Appellee’s revised attendance 
policy “prevent[ed] S.D. from making educational progress” 
and that Appellee took “retaliatory actions” and “adverse 
actions” against them as a result of “their efforts to vindicate 
S.D.’s right to a FAPE.”  Id. ¶¶ 9, 119–23, 129–32.  These 
claims also arise from educational harm and challenge the 
provision of a FAPE to S.D.  Here, as in Batchelor, there is a 
“logical path to be drawn from [Appellants’] claims of 
retaliation to [Appellee’s] failure to provide, and 
[Appellants’] effort to obtain for,” S.D. a FAPE.  759 F.3d at 
274–75.  Moreover, because the revised attendance policy 
forms the basis for all the retaliation claims, and because that 
policy made express exception for “home instruction 
approved by the district,” Am. Compl. ¶ 53; Ex. E, those 
claims too “could have been remedied by the IDEA’s 
administrative process,” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 273. 
 
 Accordingly, Appellants’ claims asserted pursuant to 
the ADA, Section 504, and § 1983 fall within the ambit of the 
IDEA and, because Appellants have not exhausted the IDEA 
administrative process, must be dismissed without prejudice.  
Again, we invoke the “strong policy” encouraging exhaustion 
of administrative remedies in these types of cases.  Where 
parents challenge a school’s provision of a FAPE and allege 
educational harm to a child, remediation of the alleged 
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educational deficiencies is best addressed in the first instance 
by educational professionals, rather than a court.6 
 
 Appellants offer several arguments against dismissal, 
none of which are availing.   
 
 First, Appellants argue that S.D. is ineligible for IDEA 
services and therefore relief is not “available” to them under 
the IDEA.  (Appellants’ Br. at 17–20.)  We, however, agree 
with the District Court that Appellants’ allegations about 
S.D.’s disability and its effect on his education “potentially 
implicate[] the statutory entitlements of the IDEA.”  See A.D., 
90 F. Supp. 3d at 338.  For a student to be eligible for IDEA 
services, the student must both:  (1) have a disability that falls 
into one or more of the statute’s enumerated categories; and 
(2) because of that disability, need “special education and 
related services.”  20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).  Asthma is an 
enumerated disability.  34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9).  The IDEA 
also requires that asthma or any other health impairment 
“[a]dversly affect[]” the student’s educational performance.  
Id.  Here, Appellants’ Amended Complaint alleges that S.D.’s 
medical problems “impact[] his ability to attend school and to 
learn,” Am. Compl. ¶ 3, and “substantially limit him in major 
life activities, specifically the life activity of learning,” id. 
¶ 12.  Further, as we explained above, Appellants’ 
allegations—in particular Appellants’ complaint that S.D. 
never received supplemental instruction—implicate a 
potential need for “special education and related services.”  
                                                 
6 Because we conclude that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over Appellants’ federal claims, we will affirm 
the District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ state law claims. 
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Therefore, we cannot conclude at this time that S.D. is 
ineligible for relief under the IDEA. 
 
 Second, Appellants argue that a FAPE under the ADA 
and Section 504 differs from the FAPE defined by the IDEA 
and, therefore, their ADA and Section 504 claims cannot be 
remedied through the IDEA administrative process.  
(Appellants’ Br. at 33–40.)  Although the statutes are not 
identical, we have previously recognized that the IDEA’s 
substantive protections overlap with those of Section 504 and 
the ADA.  See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 253 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[O]ur finding that the School District did 
not deny D.K. a FAPE [under the IDEA] is equally 
dispositive of Plaintiffs’ §504 claim.”); P.P. ex rel Michael P. 
v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 
2009) (stating that “[t]he IDEA and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act do similar statutory work,” reviewing 
similar provisions of the two statutes, and concluding that the 
IDEA’s statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs’ Section 504 
claims); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (Section 504 
regulation providing that “[i]mplementation of an [IEP under 
the IDEA] is one means of meeting the standard” for a FAPE 
under Section 504).  Moreover, as we have concluded above, 
the theory behind Appellants’ grievances focuses in large part 
on Appellee’s failure to provide special instruction to meet 
S.D.’s educational needs arising from his disability, so that 
their claims relate to the provision of a FAPE as defined by 
the IDEA. 
 
 Third, Appellants contend that the conclusion that 
S.D.’s educational injuries could be remedied through the 
IDEA administrative process assumes that Appellee violated 
its “Child Find” duty imposed by the IDEA.  (Appellants’ Br. 
20 
 
at 20.)  We disagree.  “School districts have a continuing 
obligation under the IDEA and § 504—called ‘Child Find’—
to identify and evaluate all students who are reasonably 
suspected of having a disability under the statutes.”  D.K., 
696 F.3d at 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting P.P., 585 F.3d at 
738).  We offer no opinion here as to whether Appellee 
violated its Child Find duty.  We simply decline to equate our 
finding that Appellants’ alleged educational harms could be 
remedied through the IDEA administrative process with a 
finding that Appellee violated its Child Find duty. 
 
 Our decision here does not foreclose future litigation 
arising from S.D.’s education.  See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 278 
n.15 (“This is not to say that Appellants will not be entitled to 
compensatory damages for their retaliation claims after they 
exhaust the IDEA administrative process. . . . Appellants may 
very well file a complaint containing virtually identical 
claims as asserted in the Complaint before us today.”).  We 
only hold that Appellants must first exhaust their claims 
through the IDEA administration process.  The District Court 
correctly determined that the Amended Complaint should be 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
